The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine Russell Crandall The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, by Gaddis Smith. New York: Hill & Wang, 1994. In 1923, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine, Mary Baker Eddy, the guiding force of the Christian Science Church, proclaimed: “I believe strictly in the Monroe Doctrine, in our Constitution, [End Page 254] and in the laws of God.” By the completion of The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, after one has seen the tremendous impact that the Monroe Doctrine has had on US foreign policy, this statement no longer seems so outrageous. When James Monroe initiated the historic doctrine in 1823, it had three main components: the United States should not involve itself in European wars; Europeans could no longer colonize any part of the Americas; and, most importantly, the United States would view any incursion by foreign powers into the region as a threat to national security. Smith, an eminent Yale diplomatic historian, traces the twentieth-century evolution of this pronouncement with lucidity and vigor. Behind this review of the Doctrine’s evolution lie several assertions that make this work much more than a historical survey. Smith argues that the Monroe Doctrine took a preponderant position in the minds of pre-World War II policy-makers and went on to shape American Cold War foreign policy through the Reagan administration. In his conclusion, Smith asserts that “the end of the Cold War marked the end of the Monroe Doctrine.” US administrations have used hardball tactics at various times from 1823 on, especially during the era of Teddy Roosevelt and his famous “Big Stick.” Yet, according to Smith, the advent of the Cold War dramatically changed the way the Monroe Doctrine was applied. The new reality of East versus West made “the highest officials in the American government think about Latin America in terms of global strategy, not in terms of the problems within individual countries or the region.” Thus, the “best and the brightest” (most of whom were grossly ignorant of Latin America) in the US government set out to turn Latin America into a proving ground for superpower prowess. Smith, in his best chapter, shows how this new strategy was born in 1950 when George Kennan made a whirlwind trip through Latin America. Though he admitted to absolutely no knowledge of the region, his conclusion and subsequent recommendation was that Communism in the region presented a direct threat to United States national security and needed to be dealt with through force and intervention. In Smith’s portrayal, the “Kennan Corollary” thus became the mantra with which subsequent United States administrations conducted policy towards Latin America. The examples are numerous and well-known: the 1954 CIA-led overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, the 1965 invasion [End Page 255] of the Dominican Republic, Nixon’s orders to make the Chilean economy “scream,” clandestine support for the Contras, and so on. Smith also touches on several episodes in the recent history of the Monroe Doctrine that manifest the glaring hypocrisies and double-standards that the US imposed on its Latin American neighbors: The US, for instance, maintained diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union while it discouraged Latin American nations from doing the same. The US encouraged governments to ban the Communist Party, an organization legal in the United States. These examples, however, are the more benign ones. United States policy towards Latin America also included CIA-backed covert operations and outright armed intervention. The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine shines when Smith uses his encyclopedic historical knowledge and succinct writing style to trace various ways in which the United States used and abused the Monroe Doctrine. Even seasoned Latin Americanists would benefit from Smith’s excellent chapters on Cuba, Nicaragua, Jimmy Carter, and George Kennan. However, Smith’s analysis loses rigor in the conclusion, where he disagrees with the view of those he labels “super-patriots” that American firepower and resolve defeated the “evil empire.” In Smith’s opinion, the Cold War was won because the Monroe Doctrine (which, by this time, Smith claims had become nearly indistinguishable from United States foreign policy) “exhausted” itself right along with...