Abstract
‘Material thing’ is a two‐level concept. In ‘first‐order extension’ ‐ the field of perceptual experience ‐ it is a ‘body’ that may ‘body forth’ (show, express) a ‘content’, like the bodies of persons or pictures. In ‘second‐order extension’ ‐the physical field or space ‐ it is a ‘physical object’ whose micro‐constitution is the target of the reference of theoretical terms or formulae. As such, it has no content ‐ nothing to ‘express’. In the description of a material thing in first‐order extension, terms are used whose reference is fixed by ostension. (The picture's pigment is cracked, the person's eyes are blue.) The reference of theoretical terms ‐ to the material thing in second‐order extension ‐ is fixed by their interrelationships in the theory.
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