Descartes’ Innatism as Anti-Augustinianism

Abstract

AbstractScholars have often spoken of “Augustinianism” in relation to Descartes’ theory of knowledge. Instead, this chapter intends to prove that Cartesian innatism involves a clear rejection of the Augustinian theory of knowledge. Augustine himself, searching for a suitable theory to explain knowledge of necessary and eternal truths, had rejected innatism, in the form of Platonic reminiscence, in favor of the participation of human mind in uncreated truth. Moreover, innatism had acquired a strong anti-Augustinian characterization with Aquinas. Although Aquinas rejects innatism for man, it is to this Platonic model of knowledge that he resorts when it comes to defining angels’ knowledge. Angel’s natural knowledge consists of innate ideas, independent of vision in the Word. Consequently, innatism becomes a kind of natural knowledge, as opposed to vision in God, which can be reached only via supernatural intervention. According to Descartes, the human mind, like the angel’s mind in Aquinas, knows by connatural ideas and attains the truth, even though it is separated from the divine understanding. For an attentive reader of Aquinas, innatism evokes not only angelic knowledge but also the refusal to base the search for truth on vision in God and Augustinian illumination. The proof a contrario is given by Malebranche, who regards innatism precisely as the enemy of Augustinian illumination.