Of miracles and events past: Mendelssohn on history

Abstract

ions of the mind, while contingent truths, exemplified by physics and other natural sciences, relied on both empirical observation and synthetic conceptualiza tion.74 Mendelssohn tellingly underscored these epistemological delineations by analyzing these two classes of eternal truths in terms of tradition and authority. The instruction of necessary truths could never proceed on the basis of pre-estab lished authority nor "invoke the credibility of men who maintained exactly the same thing."75 Such truths were recognized purely on the basis of their cognition. Contingent truths were different in this regard. By dint of their fundamentally experiential nature and the temporal and spacial limitations imposed by human mortality, contingent truths relied on the credibility and authority of others. This reliance on authority, however, was purely practical, for such truths were always based on observations that were verifiable and reproducible.76 This last point, importantly, pointed up the conspicuous exclusion of history as a class of contingent truth. History, after all, could not be verified or reproduced in the manner of scientific experimentation. Indeed, it was Mendelssohn's articulation of a separate category of historical truths that distinguished Jerusalem as a philosophical work. He agreed with Lessing that the truths of history could never serve as proof for eternal truths. But, drawing substantially upon his earlier writings, he carefully weighed the epistemological qualities of historical knowledge. As a separate category of historical truths, the knowledge of history was again cast in the narrowest experiential terms: these truths could "only be perceived, by means of senses, by those who were present at the time and place of its occurrence in nature."77 History here was not that of transcendent ideas, but of the temporal course of events which were always singular, always unique, and never directly accessible except to those experiencing it themselves. In Jerusalem, as before, the epistemological quality of historical knowledge determined its method of instruction. Anyone unable to experience historical events directly, Mendelssohn wrote, must accept them on authority and testimony. Furthermore, those who live at another time must rely altogether on the credibility of the testimony, for the thing attested no longer exists... The senses cannot convince them of the truth. In historical matters, the authority and credibility of the narrator constitute the only evidence. Without testimony we cannot be convinced of any historical truth. Without authority, the truth of history vanishes along with the event itself.78 The knowledge of past historical events and truths was fundamentally and exclusively an expression of tradition and authority; historical truth was simply unavailable by any other means. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.162 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 04:11:01 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Of Miracles and Events Past: Mendelssohn on History 43 Once again, the discussion of historical knowledge focused upon miracles and the law. To witness a miracle was neither an act of pure cognition nor of synthetic reasoning, but of perception. It belonged exclusively to the historical realm, and its epistemological method precluded it from teaching or, for that matter, confirming eternal truths. As in the Gegenbetrachtungen, Mendelssohn insisted that "miracles can only verify testimonies, support authorities, and confirm the credibility of witnesses and those who transmit tradition. But no testimonies and authorities can upset any established truth of reason."79 The experiential nature of historical knowledge also formed the basis and substance of Jewish law. Although Jerusalem posited separate categories for historical truths and laws, the distinction between them was purely functional. Historical truth and laws and rituals shared one systemic and epistemological basis. The historical narratives of the Bible, especially the exodus, were inextricably bound with the substance of Sinaitic revelation. Mendelssohn understood the opening of the Decalogue, wherein God was referred to in terms of the exodus, as "a historical truth, on which this people's legislation was to be founded."80 The laws, no less than the narratives, were depicted as "historical truths which, by their very nature, rest on historical evidence, must be verified by authority, and can be confirmed by miracles."81 Mendelssohn again insisted upon the binding nature of a law whose source and authority lay in history itself. I cannot see how those bom into the House of Jacob can in any conscientious manner disencumber themselves of the law. We are permitted to reflect on the law, to inquire into its spirit... to surmise a reason which, perhaps... may be liable to change in accordance with time, place, and circumstance if it pleases the Supreme Lawgiver to make known to us His will on this matter, to make it known in as clear a voice, in as public a manner, and as far beyond all doubt and ambiguity as He did when he gave the law itself. As long as this has not happened... no sophistry of ours can free us from the strict obedience we owe to the law.82 The authority of law was grounded in historical truth, ascertained through experiential encounter and its credible transmission. The authority to remove the force of obligation or substantively alter its contents lay not with legal or constitutive means, but with historical experience. The distinction between eternal truths and Jewish law formed the basis of Mendelssohn's response to Das Forschen. Judaism recognized only revealed law, but no revelation of eternal religious truths necessary for salvation. Mendelssohn went on to explain that Jewish law was enforced qua civil law only when Jews formed a politically sovereign entity, as in antiquity. The elimination of a distinct legal status for Jews was thus intrinsically tied to a rejection of ecclesiastical coercion, within the Jewish community and without. Mendelssohn, then, saw no inconsistency between his political goals and his adherence to Judaism.83 More importantly, Jerusalem offered a response to the claim that his rejection of excommunication signalled an embrace of religious historicism. The pamphlet This content downloaded from 157.55.39.162 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 04:11:01 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms