Abstract
This paper examines the effect of federal deposit insurance on the riskiness of the commercial banking system. It is generally acknowledged that a system affixed rate deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking activities. Yet very little empirical evidence exists confirming or refuting this supposition. The coefficient of variation of bank profits and the standard deviation of profits are used as measures of bank risk. How these measures of bank risk are affected by deposit insurance coverage, and other variables thought to affect bank risk, is examined. Deposit insurance is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on bank risk. This result provides empirical support for the FDIC Improvement Act requirement of risk related deposit insurance premiums starting January 1994.
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