Deontic Logic and The Priority of Moral Theory

Abstract

The development of deontic reflects a desire to capture the common ground, the underlying structure, of our moral discourse.' It has been driven by a of deontic which holds that deontic ought to be neutral between competing moral theories, and which promises a neutral battleground for moral debate. Despite this promise, I shall argue, no neutral battleground is to be found. So little is non-controversial in our deontic concepts that the principle cannot be satisfied; we can build a deontic only by accepting axioms and rules of inference that are incompatible with reasonable moral positions. Deontic cannot hover above the maelstrom of moral argumentation. As a result, if we demand neutrality we must abandon deontic logic. Conversely, if we embrace deontic logic, we must allow our logic substantive (and controversial) theorems. This does not mean that deontic has no role to play in moral theory. On the contrary, among those who have agreed on a general account of obligation, the implicit deontic they share will help to clarify disputes between particular theories. Indeed, even for those who don't share a general account, attention to the other's deontic may sharpen the issues at stake between the various approaches. Yet it does mean that there is no single deontic capable of serving as an impartial backdrop for moral theorizing. The noble desire for neutrality must remain unsated. The principle of deontic neutrality has played a primary role in arguments designed to attack that part of deontic which rules out the possibility of moral dilemmas. However, the principle's demands are not so parochial; it will be satisfied only if deontic is compatible with all tenable moral positions (and not just those which acknowledge the possibility of moral dilemmas). The question raised by the principle is whether deontic can stand