Abstract
This paper investigates how democracy influences corporate dividend policy. With a sample of 228,628 observations from 37 countries, we find that democracy is negatively associated with both the likelihood to pay dividends and the payout ratio. Moreover, we document that this effect is stronger when shareholders (creditors) are weakly (strongly) protected. These findings imply that the effect of democracy on corporate dividend policy is transmitted mainly through democratic procedures. Besides, we find that democracy also negatively affects dividend initiations.
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