Abstract
This paper is an exercise in legal democratic experimentalism and a defense of the people’s role in our juridical and political systems. I use, as example, the Catalonian Statute of Autonomy amendment approved by the Spanish Parliament. This reform produced an upheaval in Spanish politics which is seriously affecting the confidence of citizens in the whole political system. This case in point is analyzed with other polarization cases and constitutional court models in order to reach general conclusions about the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, the demos and constitutional/supreme court. The main objective is to verify that a less democratic constitutional court means more possibilities of polarization. The last issue that arises in this paper is the constitutional/supreme court’s lack of democratic legitimacy in our modern societies. The conclusion is that constitutional/supreme court legitimacy is based on violence.
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