Abstract

In recent years, scholars have begun to explore the democratic valences of Michael Oakeshott's political thought. Commentators generally present him either as a skeptical and reluctant democrat or as an advocate of deliberative democracy. This article contends that Oakeshott criticizes some epistemological and substantive commitments that are characteristic of deliberative theories, yet his vision of democracy is more robust than skeptical readers admit. Using the themes of consensus and epistemic politics as points for comparison with the ideas of Oakeshott and deliberative democrats, I consider how his theory of civil association, critique of rationalism, and characterization of conversation as “the gist and meaning of democracy” speak to contemporary democratic theory. I conclude that he offers a pluralistic ethos, rather than a self-contained model, for democratic politics that has affinities with agonistic theories of democracy.

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