Rationalism and Relativism: An Essay on John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott

Abstract

This essay creates an unlikely conversation between two 20th century thinkers: John Rawls and Michael Oakeshott. I say “unlikely” because apart from a few scant remarks in the writing of each the two did not directly engage each other. The essay begins by examining Oakeshott’s explication of “The Rationalist” and her tradition in the history of political thought. Specifically, the essay shows that rationalism in politics involves the belief that reason is an infallible guide to political activity and that the Rationalist seeks certainty and perfection in political affairs. The essay goes on to tease out the rationalistic tendencies in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, and then it analyzes Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and applies these criticisms to Rawls. Briefly, Oakeshott marks a distinction between technical and practical knowledge, and he argues that the principles that make up technical manuals like A Theory of Justice are abridgments of and no substitute for the understanding we gain through our practical experience and our participation in a given political tradition. While explaining Oakeshott’s critique of rationalism and Rawls, the essay indicates some of the relativistic proclivities in Oakeshott’s appeal to political practices and traditions, and then it entertains objections to Oakeshott that a Rawlsian might offer. Here Rawls’ commitment to the liberal tradition and the relativity implicit in his explanations of “reflective equilibrium” and “reasonableness” are examined and Rawls’ similarities to Oakeshott are noted. Ultimately, this essay argues that the strength of Rawls’ work lay not in the fact that his principles of justice are established by rational agents in an original position, but in the fact that they are principles that emerge from and cohere with ideas deeply rooted in the Western tradition itself.