Deliberation and sovereignty: The Rousseauian case for sortition

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This paper argues that the 'deliberative turn' in democracy studies could undermine the very institution that it seeks to enhance. The model of democratic representation proposed in this paper is (paradoxically) derived from JeanJacques Rousseau. Rousseau is best known for his contempt for political representation, arguing instead that popular sovereignty cannot be delegated to representatives without compromising the moral equality of all citizens required by the social contract. This obliged him to propose a system of direct popular sovereignty that was ideally suited for small political communities like Geneva or Corsica and (arguably) of little relevance to large-scale modern states. This paper proposes a radical alternative for the composition of the sovereign legislature — sortition. Although the mechanism originated in classical Athens, it has potential for application in large modern states. Moreover, unlike electoral representation, a large 'minipopulus' would not contravene Rousseau's strictures on popular sovereignty, so long as the assembly followed his call for inner (silent) deliberation, followed by voting. Active political functions, like policy proposal and advocacy, would be delegated to the physical branch of government, constituted by different principles. This paper argues that a legislature constituted by sortition would enable decision-making without the alienation of popular sovereignty, as the 'collective being' of the sovereign would be represented (in microcosm) 'by himself' (SC, II:1). The paper is at odds with many deliberative democrats as it agrees with Hobbes and Rousseau that (active) deliberation and sovereignty are antipathetic, and that the former is the prerogative of the delegated government. The paper also considers the argument for a referendum-based 'sleeping sovereign' but concludes with Dahl (1989) that an 'attentive' minipopulus would be a better alternative.