Abstract
Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, creating a negative externality that averages $92.7 billion of losses per year. This negative spillover increases with stronger ownership links to misconduct firms, when more long-term investors hold such firms’ shares, and when the institutional investor should provide higher common ownership incentives, all of which lend support to a failed monitor hypothesis. These institutional investors experience significant fund outflows in the year immediately following the fraud incidents, which increase with misconduct severity and monitoring incentives.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
