Definitions Matter: Reflections on Political Science Concept Formation

Abstract

This is the first of three papers on political science concept formation. An initial text was presented at the 2010 APSA Convention (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1644465), but, as the discussion showed, the topic is more challenging than expected. I knew that conceptual quality is determined by the nature of definitions, but, as I began to realize, it is the selection of definitional attributes that matters most. I was also aware that scholars work with a conception of the matter investigated, with pre-conceived images of Homo politicus. I was surprised, however, to see how varied and intricate the interplay between attribute selection and images can be. These insights are not overly surprising. After all, we are dealing with both concept formation and politics. A single article grew into a publication composed of three parts. Part I addresses basic issues of concept formation. The focus is mainly on definitional attributes and their impact on conceptual usefulness. Attribute selection is important, because it determines how typical or atypical, tight or loose, hard or soft conceptual arrangements are. Finally, and as mentioned, it is a scholar’s image of Homo politicus that plays a role. Its interrelation with the three formal aspects can vary but is of crucial importance. All of these dimensions, in various combinations, determine conceptual functionality or, differently put, a concept’s usefulness in grasping and shaping reality. The purpose of Part II is to look at a concrete example, at David Easton's well-known definition of politics as “authoritative value allocation”. If the definition is regarded as useful by many, it is because Easton’s image of Homo politicus is successfully combined with the three more formal aspects of defining mentioned above. The concept, as a result, is a useful instrument in grasping and shaping political reality. Among other things it permits the identification of interesting variables, which is of particular importance to a behavioural empiricist like Easton. The definition’s integrative potential is considerable as well. As we will see, it is relevant for the study of both government and of international politics. Part III is more broadly conceived; the definitional modes of six different approaches are examined. The question, once again, is how formal aspects of defining combine with substantive images of Homo politicus. The examples analysed include such diverse approaches as inter-subjective discursivism, rational positivism and naturalist determinism. Small wonder that the combinations detected vary significantly. Explicit and tacit images of politics combine in different ways with attributes that are typical or atypical, tight or loose and hard or soft. Needless to add that some approaches are more functional than others.