Abstract
The connection between space and cyberspace domains is increasingly intertwined. Advancements in space technology, decreasing costs for satellite development, and the use of commercial off-the-shelf products present many cybersecurity challenges to space infrastructure. Additionally, space-based global critical infrastructure makes the space domain a prime target for malicious cyber threats. Software-defined radios introduce a potential attack vector for adversaries planning malicious satellite activity. This paper demonstrates how an adversary would send malicious commands via a software-defined radio to affect the integrity of the sensors on the satellite running NASA's core Flight System software. The experiment demonstrates one possible threat vector using a commercially available USRP N210 software-defined radio. The results show that well-constructed messages can be created to manipulate sensors on a target small satellite system. Identifying cybersecurity vulnerabilities like these in space systems can improve security and prevent disruptions for the global space enterprise.
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call