Abstract
We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. The challenge is that while Simulation Theory can account for Theory of Mind errors, it cannot account for their systematic nature. There are Theory of Mind errors seen in social psychological research with adults where persons are either overly generous or overly cynical in how rational they expect others to be. There are also Theory of Mind errors observable in developmental data drawn from Maxi-type false belief tests. We provide novel responses to several examples showing that Simulation Theory can answer these challenges.
Highlights
We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind
Saxe (2005) challenges Simulation Theory of Mind (ST) by noting occasional systematic error when persons assess the mental states of others
We propose that simulation of others does not include simulation of their cognitive biases, which is why there can be systematic errors in mindreading
Summary
We defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against a challenge from the Theory Theory of Mind. Saxe (2005) challenges Simulation Theory of Mind (ST) by noting occasional systematic error when persons assess the mental states of others.
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