Decision strategies for the WEEE reverse supply chain under the “Internet + recycling” model

Abstract

Online recycling has been recognized as an efficient method to increase the recovery amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). However, due to lack of supply and demand coordination, the operational performance of the “Internet + recycling” model in WEEE is not ideal. Thus, the question of how to effectively balance the relationship among consumers, recyclers, and the government is of great importance for the establishment of the “Internet + recycling” model. This paper builds a dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain (RSC) decision model using the Stackelberg game model, and discusses the impact of consumer perception, efforts of online recycler, and government regulations on collection price, quantity, and profit. The findings show that increasing the consumer preference for the online recycling channel can enhance the WEEE recovery scale and the profit of the RSC, and the online recycler, through its efforts, can rectify the disadvantage of consumer preference for the online channel. Government subsidy regulation can promote the enthusiasm of consumers and enterprises for recycling. Moreover, reward-penalty regulation will disrupt the stability of forward supply chain, while the RSC is more coordinated. These findings provide valuable reference to increase the WEEE collection quantity and to promote the development of the “Internet + recycling” model.