Abstract
In this paper a positive theory of internal bureaucratic decision-making is presented. A model is formulated to explain why some decisions within a public bureaucracy are decentralized, while others are not. The explanation, using the notions of principal-agent theory, involves such factors as different access to information and different objectives of central and decentral actors. An empirical test of the model is carried out using data on decisions of local government in the Netherlands on capacity reductions in hospitals.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
