Abstract
This study investigates debtholders’ responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging. We found that share pledging by controlling shareholders is crucial for reducing agency costs. This lessens the information asymmetry of outsiders by strengthening pledgee supervision, and decreases companies’ risk-taking by adopting a relatively conservative investment strategy that hedges excessive risks. This also reduces the impact of insider control, decreases the interest spread, and increases the length of loan maturity. Further analyses show that the favorable effect of share pledging on bank loan covenants weakens for companies with a higher degree of financing deficit. Additionally, the role of share pledging varies with the agency costs of companies’ insider controls. The effects of share pledging on bank loan terms are more profound for companies with a higher degree of corporate governance performance. Robustness analyses addressing potential endogeneity further confirm our primary conclusions.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call