Abstract
The concern of this paper is to analyse what kind of replay to the problem of the philosophical scepticism we can expect from the so-called transcendental arguments. The general conclusion is that transcendental arguments are not able to neutralise the sceptical doubts considered as verbal formulations of logical possibilities. Now, provided that the sceptic cannot meaningfully present his doubts, it seems that he has only three options: to doubt with the aid of a mystical silence, to doubt using the words in a metaphorical or evocative sense, or to doubt using the words with literal sense, but being conscious that he is saying a nonsense. To sum up: the sceptical doubt can never have the value of a real doubt.
Highlights
The concern of this paper is to analyse what kind of replay to the problem of the philosophical scepticism we can expect from the so-called transcendental arguments
In spite of what is sometimes said, scepticism should not be viewed as a simple invention of some obsessive philosophers of foundationalist position
The second element of scepticism is the fact that this bewitchment goes hand-in-hand with the logical possibility that things are not just what they seem
Summary
The concern of this paper is to analyse what kind of replay to the problem of the philosophical scepticism we can expect from the so-called transcendental arguments. From transcendental positions he might assert that foundationalist sceptical arguments lack meaning because they violate the a priori conditions of possibility of language and knowledge.
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