Dayton’s Annex 4 Constitution at 20: political stalemate, public dissatisfaction and the rebirth of self-organisation

Abstract

Designed as a provisional draft constitution, Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement has functioned as the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, and is likely to continue to do so for some time. While it has achieved the immediate goal of cessation of hostilities, under the Annex 4 state institutions have grown that are dysfunctional and parasitic while imposing a counterproductive ethnifying dynamic on political activity. International oversight, intended to mollify these anticipated effects, has been weak and uneven, and frequently intensifies conflicts it was meant to moderate. This has led to a growing gulf between the political class and citizens, expressed in protests and in a growing movement to circumvent official institutions. In this regard, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have demonstrated democratic potential well beyond the level demonstrated by their representatives or international overseers. Twenty years after its introduction, the role of the Annex 4 Constitution has become more to inhibit these democratic developments than to encourage them.