Abstract

Summary This article discusses two prominent theories of intentional action in the analytical philosophy of mind. First, the psychological theory of Donald Davidson—based on reasons for action—is presented in connection with his anomalous monism. After a specification of three important problems in this intentional psychology, secondly, the social theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein—based on the observance of a rule—is introduced in an attempt to overcome these problems. But because of the intimate relationship between reasons and rules, the conclusion is that only a hybrid theory of intentional action can constitute the necessary as well as the sufficient conditions for an analysis of human action.

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