The Concept of Intention in Anscombe’s Philosophy of Action

Abstract

This article critically examines Elisabeth Anscombe’s philosophy of action. Anscombe’s theory of intentional action was presented in her monograph Intention (1957), which is now an acknowledged classic of analytic philosophy. Intention established the field of analytic philosophy of action, defined the main problems of the field, and largely determined its further development. However, the study of Intention is complicated by the author’s methodology, her writing style, and the lack of any kind of a clear summary of the results of her inquiry. The aim of this paper is to present Anscombe’s theory of intentional action in a comprehensible way without oversimplifying her genuine thought. The first part of the paper contains some brief biographical information about Anscombe’s life and philosophical development, the social and philosophical context of Intention, and its place in Anscombe’s philosophy in general. The second part of the paper explains the basic structure of Intention, states its general task, presents the central line of reasoning and the main arguments, highlights the particular theses and questions that significantly influenced the development of the analytical philosophy of action. The resulting interpretation demonstrates that Anscombe’s theory passes between the extremes of different versions of Cartesian dualism on the one hand, and the complete negation of the significance of the mental in the theory of action, on the other.