Da li i kako reformisati ustavni sud?

Abstract

The heralded constitutional amendment does not seem to encompass the constitutional judiciary, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitutional Court is in a major crisis. For a number of reasons, the forthcoming constitutional reform should include a fundamental reconstruction of the present model of the constitutional judiciary in all its dimensions. The changes to the Constitution should encompass not only the organization and jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court but also the decision-making procedures and the legal effect of the Constitutional Court meritory decisions. In essence, the Constitutional Court should be regulated as the fourth branch of government. The competences of the Constitutional Court should be significantly narrowed, and reduced to the normative control of international treaties, laws and regulations, as well as deciding on constitutional complaints. Thus, the Constitutional Court would focus on the timely resolution of 'real' constitutional disputes. The independence of the Constitutional Court and the independent position of the judiciary should be institutionally reinforced by introducing more stringent conditions for the appointment/election of judges, which would guarantee the genuine political neutrality of the Constitutional Court as an institution and the impartiality of the Constitutional Court judges. The Constitution should validate the complex internal structure of the Constitutional Court and the existing decision-making processes, and provide for the rationalization of the constitutional court procedure It is also necessary to specify the legal effect of the Constitutional Court decisions, especially constitutional complaints, which would lead to establishing clear relations with the regular judicial power. Thus, qualitative institutionalization, as the first premise of constitutional judicature, would become normatively stable, functionally non-controversial, logically coherent and practically sustainable.