Abstract

Abstract : Cyberspace has grown in importance to the United States (US), as well as the rest of the word. As such, the impact of cyberspace attacks have increased with time. Threats can be categorized as state or non-state actors. This research paper looks at state actors. It asks the question, should the US adopt a mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine for cyberspace? In order to answer this question, this research used a parallel historical case study. The case study was the US's nuclear MAD doctrine of the 1960s. What was the answer? The question is better left to the politicians. As with nuclear strategies, statesmen must decide if the MAD strategy for cyberspace is acceptable or unacceptable. If it is acceptable, they must decide the threat thresholds. In other words, when will the US pull the trigger. If US statesmen decide to purse a CyberMAD policy, they must ensure that the capability exists, that the US has the will to carry through on it, and that the opponent fears the consequences. Without these three criteria, the credibility of the threat is reduced, thus, the deterrence effect is reduced. Finally, regardless of the strategy the US chooses, one item is clear. The US can either choose to defend, or to defend and deter. The first option is purely defensive in nature. The second is defensive and offensive in nature. The US already has the capability to destroy cyberspace, but does it have the will? Politicians will need to answer this question.

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