Abstract
Focusing upon the unique cumulative voting-multiple member district electoral system employed in the selection of members to the lower chamber of the Illinois General As sembly, this article reexamines several propositions about electoral competition which have resulted from analyses of plurality voting-single member district electoral systems. Competition for and the results of races for house seats during the 1966 to 1976 period constitute the data base of the present study. Although a number of patterns are revealed, the key finding suggested by our analysis is that this peculiar Illinois electoral mechanism appears to have the effect of stimulating intraparty competition in primary elections, particularly in the "weak" party in "safe" one-party districts, while at the same time putting a damper on interparty competition during the general election campaign.
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