`Cultural Deviance Theory':

Abstract

Costello (1997) has attempted to defend Kornhauser's (1978) interpretation of Sutherland's differential association theory as a `cultural deviance theory.' In so doing, she claims that Matsueda (1988), Akers (1996) and Bernard and Snipes (1996) have misinterpreted Sutherland's theory to the point of altering the original theory to respond to Kornhauser's criticisms. In this article, I point out that Costello has merely continued Kornhauser's misinterpretation of differential association theory and that the logical flaws she finds apply to the caricature of what Sutherland called `cultural deviance theory,' but have little to do with Sutherland's differential association theory. Finally, I argue that the important distinction between control theories and differential association theory is whether motivation to crime is constant across persons (Hirschi, 1969), whether criminal organization and subcultures are irrelevant to criminality (Kornhauser, 1978) and whether crime can never be learned or transmitted across individuals. Control theories distinguish themselves from other theories of crime by answering `yes' to each of these questions. Differential association theory answers `no' to these questions, which opens important puzzles for criminological research and theory.