Cruise Control: The Logical Next Step in Nuclear Arms Control?

Honorable Andy Weber,Christine Parthemore

doi:10.1080/25751654.2019.1681886

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe world is at the start of a new nuclear arms race, with the demise of important arms control agreements and increasingly robust nuclear weapons modernization and expansion plans by multiple countries. As such, the international community is searching for ideas that could change this trajectory and reinvigorate arms control. This article explores one of these ideas: to limit and eliminate nuclear-armed cruise missiles, whether delivered by air, sea, or land. Many countries and non-governmental organizations have developed this concept over the past several years. At times referred to as “cruise control,” it is seen by many who have explored the issue to be attractive, feasible, and likely to be in the mutual interests of many nations.

Highlights

The world is at the start of a new nuclear arms race, with the demise of important arms control agreements and increasingly robust nuclear weapons modernization and expansion plans by multiple countries
The international community is searching for ideas that could change this trajectory and reinvigorate arms control
In 2016, notes from a meeting of experts convened by the Governor of Hiroshima recommended: “We propose that there be international negotiations on the prohibition of the development and acquisition of long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads to bridge the gap between nuclear states and non-nuclear states and open a new round of negotiations to reduce the risk of nuclear war” (Hiroshima Round Table 2016)

Summary

Introduction

The world is at the start of a new nuclear arms race, with the demise of important arms control agreements and increasingly robust nuclear weapons modernization and expansion plans by multiple countries. Future arms control agreements must work to bring together nuclear weaponspossessing states and other nations This may include countries that do not yet have specific types of nuclear weapons but are willing to refrain from developing them if others do the same. A small group posited a “specific arms control option: a ban on nuclear SLCMs [sea-launched cruise missiles] of all ranges, with no constraint on conventional SLCMs” (Lewis, Ride, and Townsend 1989) They devised a plan by which U.S and Soviet SLCMs could be verified as non-nuclear through inspection, tagging, and sealing at a special verification facility; plus monitoring of the movement of weapons to and from such facilities. For the reasons this article outlines, nuclear cruise control is the best option in the near term to restore confidence that the NPT-centric regime can continue to meet the needs of all of its signatories

Conclusion

Notes on Contributors