Abstract
Kihyeon Kim (1994) has attempted to rescue the deontological conception of epistemic justification from a line of criticism advanced by William Alston. According to this conception justification is understood as a matter of being epistemically responsible; of believing what one ought to believe. Alston (1986) argues that the deontological conception is implausible because it entails doxastic voluntarism (the view that one can exercise direct voluntary control over what one believes at any given moment). Alston notes that we rarely, if ever, can exercise such control. For example, upon seeing a truck coming down the street, one is not at liberty to either believe or refrain from believing that the truck is coming down the street. Kim summarizes Alston's argument as follows:
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