Crisis in South American regionalism and Brazilian protagonism in Unasur, the Lima Group and Prosur

Pedro Silva Barros,Julia de Souza Borba Gonçalves

doi:10.1590/0034-7329202100209

Abstract

Abstract This paper discusses the crisis in regional governance in South America from 2017 onwards by analyzing Unasur’s disintegration and the emergence of new arrangements (the Lima Group, Prosur, and the Leticia Pact), as well as the regional and global conditions that enabled them. We assessed their performance in responding to different crises in South America, concluding that the constraints and challenges they faced jeopardize their aim to prosper in the future. Special attention is given to changes in Brazilian foreign policy guidelines toward South America, which contributed to these outcomes.

Highlights

In 2016, phenomena such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump – and his decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Area with Canada and Mexico – were events that “revitalized the argument that regional integration had gone too far curtailing state power in favour of regional institutions” (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2018, 160)
We demonstrate that neither the Lima Group, nor Progress of South America (Prosur) or the Leticia Pact, can promote regional governance, since they exacerbate the same structural problems observed in Unasur
Prosur presidents recognized the need to preserve the acquis of integration within a new framework during the First Presidential Meeting (Prosur 2019a), Prosur refused to include Venezuela in the discussions on regional governance, and Isags was no longer operational, nor had it been incorporated into Prosur, leaving South America without executive and technical institutions to properly tackle the pandemic by the time it became widespread in the region, favoring individual foreign donations to South American countries, mainly from China (Barros et al 2020a)

Summary

Introduction

In 2016, phenomena such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump – and his decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership and renegotiate the North American Free Trade Area with Canada and Mexico – were events that “revitalized the argument that regional integration had gone too far curtailing state power in favour of regional institutions” (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2018, 160). As Sanahuja and López (2020) argue, the political changes that took place from 2015 to 2018 in South America were followed by the emergence of a neo-patriotic far-right, whose political actions to impact the system rely on their ability to diffuse their ideology through discursive practices, either by leading governments (Brazil and Colombia) or joining political coalitions that support liberal-conservative right-wing governments (Chile) To some extent, these countries – which had shaped Unasur and actively participated in its events in previous decades - prompted the narrative of Unasur having an institutional framework that was too costly and not presenting effective results, later adopting the “anti-Bolivarian” rhetoric (Barros et al 2020a). From August 2018 to March 2019, the main arguments to withdraw from Unasur and later to establish Prosur and its guidelines were consolidated: i) Venezuela’s ideological influence over Unasur; ii) the problem of consensus decision-making; iii) Unasur’s onerous budget These arguments were leveraged in a context of right-wing and far-right governments in South America and their increased ties with the US – especially under Trump’s administration – regarding the management of the Venezuelan crisis.

Thematic Areas Absolute Majority

Findings

Conclusion