Criminal Culpability and Self-Control: Back to M'Naughton

Abstract

The quandary regarding self-control and criminal culpability has been an intriguing challenge for centuries. Some scholars argue that the capacity to think rationally should be the sole criterion for criminal culpability, while self-control plays a negligible role. As an illustration to this view, Morse argues that lack of rationality has been the legal basis for Daniel M'Naughton's exculpation in 1843, one of the most important trials in the history of mental health law. As opposed to Morse's view, it is suggested that the question of free agency and self-control was an integral part of the legal discussion regarding M'Naughton's culpability. In fact, M'Naughton's defense approach goes hand in hand with contemporary philosophical and psychological theories concerning mental dysfunction and blame attribution. Thus, acknowledgment of the diverse approaches to the relevance of self-control to criminal culpability offers a more balanced and accurate perspective.