Crafting anti-corruption agencies’ bureaucratic reputation: an uphill battle

Abstract

The widespread implementation of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has been an important public administration trend of the past decades. Considering the multifaceted challenges they face, much attention has been afforded to the legal structures which condition their bureaucratic autonomy. Little is known, however, about the reputational dimension of the autonomy of ACAs. This paper contributes a theoretical bridge between bureaucratic reputation theory and the anti-corruption literature, by studying how these agencies construct and manage their reputations over time. Using a mixed-methods research design, this paper employs a narrative analysis of commission hearings and semi-structured interviews, paired with quantitative content analysis of media articles and agency web-communications. The case of Quebec’s (Canada) ACA shows the inherent challenges, strategies and non-linearity of reputation building, which enriches our understanding of the difficulty of crafting an agency’s de facto bureaucratic autonomy.