Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution: An Update of Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court from 1955–1984

Abstract

This study investigates the validity of the common practice of differentiating between “high” and “low frequency” periods of congressional attacks on the Supreme Court. In-depth examination of the Congressional Record from 1955–1984 reveals 1,497 previously uncounted constitutional amendment attacks. Rather than starting and stopping, the never-ending court curbing efforts of this era evolved in four phases, differentiated by shifts in an unexamined dimension—leadership of attacks. This suggests that modern attacks may be a way for partisan and regional coalition managers to “signal” others (including those outside the Court) in efforts to maintain, build, or assert their party's dominance. Court curbing may therefore play a greater role than realized in party system development, making congressional attacks an overlooked “mechanism” through which coalitional change may be both opposed and wrought.