Countering Insurgency from the Air: The Postwar Lessons

Abstract

Air power has been employed in counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns almost since its inception in the first decade of the 20th century. The utility of aircraft against insurgents has been controversial and punctuated by debates as to its efficacy, as well as by concern over the political complications that can be caused by its use. Drawing upon a variety of post-Second World War examples, this paper contends that air power is of considerable value to the security forces in COIN campaigns, particularly in the reconnaissance and transport roles. Although modern weapons and targeting devices have increased the value of aircraft in striking against insurgents, the article suggests that there are distinct limitations to the employment of air strikes against such targets, though the presence of air power can exert a significant psychological influence. Air power's contribution to a COIN campaign is best measured not in isolation, but rather in terms of its contribution to the joint effort of the security forces.