Abstract
Charles Taliaferro has written a sympathetic and generally accurate account of my version of the ideal observer theory (1OT), as set forth in The Status of Morality.' However, I remain unpersuaded by most of his main criticisms. The most important area of disagreement between us is over the question whether ideal observers (1Os) could disagree in their attitudes about any moral questions. Taliaferro claims that lOs (as characterized by Firth) would all agree in their attitudes about all moral questions.' This issue is very important within the context of the lOT, since, according to the IOT, questions about the objectivity of morals are to be answered by determining the extent to which lOs would agree (in their attitudes or judgments) about moral questions. Firth would accept roughly the following as a criterion for the objective truth of moral judgments:
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