Relativising the Ideal Observer Theory

Abstract

Attitudinal metaethical theories come in objectivist and relativist kinds. An attitudinal metaethics analyzes the moral properties of action (right, wrong, indifferent, supererogatory) in terms of the attitudes of individuals or society. Some relativist theories allow that some act, A, is morally right vis-a-vis Eric in virtue of his approving A, but wrong vis-a-vis Miriam in virtue of her disapproving of A. There are several versions of absolutist attitudinal theories. Brentano advanced the thesis that moral judgments amount to claims about the correctness and incorrectness of attitudes. It is nonrelativistic, as a particular act A could not be correctly approved and disapproved of or, to use his locution, correctly loved and hated at once. Either Eric or Miriam or both are mistaken in their moral judgments. A more familiar objectivist thesis is that an act is right if and only if it would be approved of under idealized circumstances, conditions which constitute the moral point of view. Thus, the ideal observer ethical theory maintains an act is right if and only if it would be approved of by an ideal observer. Eric is right if and only if an ideal observer would approve of A. Although most forms of the ideal observer theory are objectivist, Thomas Carson in The Status of Morality has recently advanced an intriguing ideal observer theory (henceforth IOT and 10 for ideal observer) which combines objectivist and relativistic elements.' According to Carson, the standard for the truth or correctness of moral judgments, including judgments about rightness and wrongness of actions, lies in what individuals would approve of were they to satisfy certain ideal conditions, conditions I spell out below. Unlike earlier ideal observer theorists like Roderick Firth, Carson contends that lOs may disagree. Some given act, A, may be both moraly right and wrong at once in that Eric, if an 10,