Abstract
We consider multipopulation Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player’s own action, the distribution of players’ actions in all populations, and an unknown state parameter. We study the nonatomic limit versions of these games and introduce the concept of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium, which extends the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium to nonatomic games. We prove that Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria are limits of action flows induced by Bayes correlated equilibria of the game with a large finite set of small players. For nonatomic games with complete information admitting a convex potential, we prove that the set of correlated and of coarse correlated Wardrop equilibria coincide with the set of probability distributions over Wardrop equilibria and that all equilibrium outcomes have the same costs. We get the following consequences. First, all flow distributions of (coarse) correlated equilibria in convex potential games with finitely many players converge to mixtures of Wardrop equilibria when the weight of each player tends to zero. Second, for any sequence of flows satisfying a no-regret property, its empirical distribution converges to the set of distributions over Wardrop equilibria, and the average cost converges to the unique Wardrop cost. Funding: This work was partially supported by European Cooperation in Science and Technology Action 16228 GAMENET. F. Koessler acknowledges the support of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant StratCom ANR-19-CE26-0010-01]. M. Scarsini acknowledges the support of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni project [Grant CUP_E53C22001930001], the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale [Grant 2022EKNE5K], and the European Union-Next Generation EU, component M4C2, investment 1.1 (Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) [Grant P2022XT8C8]. T. Tomala gratefully acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation and Agence Nationale de la Recherche/Investissements d’Avenir [Grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047].
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