Correction Note: Political-Economic Factors Influencing State Medicaid Policy

Abstract

I gratefully acknowledge Evan Rindquist for alerting me to the fact that I had incorrectly stacked the data (by year by state, instead of by state by year) to run my model in SHAZAM.' Although the correct results still largely support my theoretical model, there are a few important differences that warrant the attention of PRQ readers. In the interest of space, I highlight the important substantive differences in results. My theory predicted a different political process for each of the Medicaid policy dimensions. Financial eligibility policy was hypothesized to have a narrow constituency boundary and limited interest group pressure: the factors affecting voters' determination of the AFDC payment level-the low-income wage rate and potential for welfare migration-are significant and in the hypothesized direction. However, contrary to the previously reported results, recipient race is insignificant (see Table 1). Because other studies have reported significant associations between race and state benefit levels, it is important to highlight that the correct result suggest that race-measured as the proportion of non-white AFDC recipients-does not influence AFDC financial eligibility levels. The corrected results still provide evidence of interest group pressure, as predicted, for categorical eligibility policy (both the number of optional programs and the MN income levels) and benefit coverage policy: interest group variables-IG2 and IG3 respectively-are significantly positive in all three equations. However, senior and nursing home interest group strength (IG2) is positively related to AFDC financial eligibility (not negative as previously reported and contrary to my hypothesis). One reason these groups may positively influence the AFDC financial eligibility level is because the Medically Needy Income maximum is restricted to 133 percent of the AFDC income