Abstract
Approaching the institutional environment through its regulative component, we distinguish between shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented countries. Identifying first this classification with the distinction between common law versus civil law countries and using a large sample of 5,716 firm-year observations that represents 1,169 individual firms in 25 countries between 2001 and 2011, we show that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) significantly reduces firms’ idiosyncratic risk in civil law countries but not in common law countries. Using then a more direct classification based on shareholder and employee protection scores, our findings suggest that CSR negatively affects firms’ idiosyncratic and systematic risks only in less shareholder-oriented and more stakeholder-oriented countries, respectively. These findings are similar in the different components of CSR with two notable exceptions: A high score in corporate governance reduces firm risk only in common law countries, and community involvement increases idiosyncratic risk in more shareholder-oriented and less stakeholder-oriented countries, respectively. Taken together, our results strongly support the view that the relationship between CSR and financial risk is moderated by the institutional context of the firm.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.