Corporate Involvement in Slavery and Criminal Responsibility under International Law

Abstract

In a worldwide market economy with strong demand for cheap labour and a global society that exposes millions of individuals to poverty and deprives them of their economic human rights, exploitation amounting to slavery is profitable, and endemic. And although corporate involvement in modern slavery is notorious and slavery and slavery-related practices may qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, commentators have repeatedly noted the general reluctance of institutionalized criminal justice to engage in prosecution of corporate involvement in slavery. This article aims to shed some light on the legal issues at the intersection of slavery, corporate action and international criminal law. Beginning with drawing a basic distinction between crime under international law and transnational crime, the analysis delves into criminal responsibility under international law. It then proceeds in two steps. First, the author examines the definitions of crimes under international law as they are laid down in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, and enquires which of these are applicable to the prosecution of slavery and slavery-related practices, what are their requirements and what are the major problems of their charging. Second, the author turns to issues of attribution: how is criminal responsibility to be attributed and to whom, i.e. the corporation itself or the individual corporate officer? The article concludes with a plea to take advantage of the existing framework of international criminal law and to apply it more determinedly to corporate contexts.