Corporate governance, stickiness and losses

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to study the impact of a significant negative shock (the reporting of an initial loss) on the stickiness of corporate governance. This paper examines whether corporate governance changes in response to the reporting of an initial loss and also whether ex ante corporate governance weakness impacts on the propensity for change. Design/methodology/approach – The study uses three years of corporate governance information spanning the report of an initial loss for companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange. An industry- and size-matched control sample is used in a difference-in-difference analysis to isolate the impact of the loss from underlying changes in governance. Findings – The results indicate that an initial loss precipitates an improvement in corporate governance and that this improvement is significantly more pronounced in those companies which displayed either weak or extreme governance before the loss. There is also evidence that the improvement in corporate governance begins before the loss is actually reported. Research limitations/implications – This study focuses on a three-year period in the UK only and so is a limitation of the research. Future research could be based on the findings from other jurisdictions or from using other conditioning variables. Originality/value – This study contributes to the stream of research that examines negative shocks, and losses in particular, as an event likely to precipitate firm-level changes in corporate governance and offers insights into the reasons for firm-level corporate governance improvements. It demonstrates that, notwithstanding the recommendations of the Combined Code, firms tend to not make improvements without the impetus and need to do so, i.e. corporate governance is sticky.