Abstract
We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust—one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.
Highlights
In this paper, I ask how future people might rethink the moral status of corporate groups, and what we can learn from reflection on their moral thinking
"Why Should We Think About Possible Futures?" section explains why we should care about possible futures, "The Present Debate About Corporate Agency" section introduces the current debate about corporate agency, while "Broken Futures" and "Digital Futures" sections argue that people living in broken and digital futures will think very differently about corporate agency
Why should we think about possible futures? In particular, why should we care what future people might think about corporate groups? I argue in "Broken Futures" section that people in possible broken futures will be more likely to accept the reality of corporate moral agency, and more reluctant to recognise the moral agency of corporate groups that cannot prove themselves to be morally reliable
Summary
There is a substantial philosophical literature on the moral status of groups and collectives (e.g. French 1979; Velasquez 2003; Copp 2007; List and Pettit 2011; Hess 2013; Hindriks 2014; and the other works cited below). If we seek to develop and bequeath an account of corporate groups that serves our practical purposes, and if we care about future people at all, we need to know what they will find useful or credible. The best interpretation of our present practice will be sensitive to future threats Both pragmatists and interpretivists seek a temporally robust account of corporate groups: one that provides the inhabitants of a broad range of credible futures with the conceptual resources they need to recognise, constrain, and hopefully avoid the particular threats that are most salient to them. Future people may see things differently because they recognise new moral individuals (such as digital people); accept different accounts of people’s rights and responsibilities; regard different features of persons as important; favour different interpretations of contested concepts such as intentionality or consciousness; have different general philosophical priorities; or face different threats from corporate groups. I ask how people living in those futures might re-imagine our debates about corporate groups, and what we might learn from their future debates
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