Coping with the ‘Security-Development Nexus’: The European Union and the Instrument for Stability

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, it has become widely accepted in policy and academic circles alike that both foreign/security policy and development policy are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Similar to international organisations such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union has commenced to emphasise the need for forging a closer link between these ‘distinct’ policy arenas. In its 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, for example, the European Council maintained that ‘there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (European Council, 2008, p. 8). As security and development policy face different time horizons and sometimes enshrine different objectives, this affirmation touches upon one of the core questions in development policy: under which conditions can development assistance fulfil its goals? With a view to fragile states, in particular, recent studies have confirmed that rapid and sustained donor engagement is likely to ‘significantly increases the chances of a […] turnaround’ (Chauvet and Collier, 2006, p. 14). Thus far, the EU’s response to emerging political crises in third countries has been criticised as slow, cumbersome and, as a result, ineffective; it was lacking a single and unified instrument at the EU level that could have been initiated on very short notice and implemented rapidly.