Coping with Moral Uncertainty

Abstract

More than we usually let on, I suspect, we moral philosophers appreciate that rival moral theories stand a decent chance of being right. I might be a consequentialist, but I cannot deny the existence of compelling arguments and intuitions on the deontological side. Moreover, although it seems to me extremely implausible that there really is nothing bad about torment or wrong with cruelty, I cannot entirely shut out worries that the moral nihilists might be right. It is high time we moral philosophers owned up to our doubts and squarely faced the question of how to incorporate such uncertainty into moral thought and practice. A few philosophers have pioneered this sort of inquiry. Among them, no one has thought as long, hard, and well about moral epistemology as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Unlike most of us in ethics, Sinnott-Armstrong does not come to questions of moral epistemology as an amateur he has made original contributions to epistemology proper, especially on the subject of skepticism. So I come to his excellent book, Moral Skepticisms, x less as a critic than as someone eager to learn more and understand his view better. My comment therefore will consist primarily in a request for clarification.