Cooperation in R&D through a network, an ‘organizational gamble’? an empirical analysis of rhône poulenc rorer-gencell

Abstract

This paper is based on the empirical analysis of innovation challenges to Rhône Poulenc Rorer-Gencell (RPR-Gencell) resulting from development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industy. These we identify as an organizational innovation involving the development of a network of partners following and/or inducing a technological innovation. RPR-Gencell represents a ‘style of innovation’ since it is based on various factors specific to the firm and corresponds to a new organizational form, the ‘tight network’ of partners. We argue that this organizational from, in the context of the development of biotechnology in the pharmaceutical industry, can be likened to an ‘organizational gamble’ associated with a ‘technological gamble’ Altogether, this ‘gamble’ dimension means that the network of partners in R&D is still a marginal organizational form. After an introduction we show that the specficities of the pharmaceutical industry especialy since the emergence of biotechnohgy have led to the emergence of a multiplicity of institutional arrangements governing cooperation in R&D. We take as a specific example that of gene therapy. Later on, we present some stylized facts to emphasize the diversity among the network organizational forms. The network of partners is an alternative to the other complex but ‘clarsical’ forms of cooperation (R&D agreements, cross-licensing, joint-ventures, mergers/acquisilions). We propose a new definition of the network based on the case of RPR-Gencell: the ‘tight network’. We distinguish between the ‘tight network’ and all the other approaches, focusing in particular on the ‘loose network’ of cooperative relationship (mostly multifirm alliances implemented with several bilateral contracts). Only two pharmaceutical companies have adopted the ‘tight network’ to govern their cooperation in R&D. We present the network ofpartners as an organizational innovation governing a technological innovation. We argue that this organizational innovation could be likened to an ‘organizational gamble’ in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, we show that the network raises several organizational issues since it short-circuits traditional strategic operations in the pharamaceutical industry. We argue that among many different reasons, RPR's technological choices (especially the priorig given to gene therapy) have influenced the creation of its network of partners. As a conclusion, we discuss the link between the organizational innovation and the technological innovation focusing on the ‘gamble’ dimension of such an innovation.