Abstract
We give quantitative support to intuition that other-regarding orientations (ORO) can eliminate social dilemmas in human interactions. Our considerations are based on a formal model of ORO applied in particular to the popular multi-person social dilemma games with two strategies, cooperation and defection: the multi-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Public Good game. Two types of ORO: minimal individual payoff orientation and group aggregated payoff orientation are considered. We obtain remarkably simple analytical expressions on the thresholds of the parameters determining the contribution of ORO to the utility functions of the players, necessary to enjoy full cooperation, i.e., to strict domination of the cooperative strategy for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good game, and absence of such domination for other considered social dilemmas.
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