Conviction without Imposition: A Response to Professor Greenawalt

Abstract

For some time Professor Kent Greenawalt has been struggling with the tough issue of when those with religious convictions may “properly rely on [them] in deciding what public laws and policies to support.” Professor Greenawalt's thesis is that individuals must resolve many public policy questions for which “publicly accessible reasons” provide an insufficient solution. Each person is therefore forced to resort to “personal experiences and commitments of value ….” Since “everyone must inevitably use ‘nonpublic’ reasons … people whose experience leads them to religious convictions should not have to disregard what they consider the critical insights about value that their convictions provide.” I admire Professor Greenawalt's work greatly and find in it much with which I agree. In two important respects, however, I differ. The first is a matter of perspective. Professor Greenawalt's goal is to determine when a good member of our liberal democracy would rely on his or her religious convictions. My goal is to determine when an obedient Christian would do so. Our difference in approach is best shown by Professor Greenawalt's comments concerning one of his illustrations, Jody. Jody believes that God both “considers the drinking of alcohol to be sinful” and “wishes that organized societies stamp out this practice ….” Professor Greenawalt believes that Jody, in seeking laws against the drinking of alcohol, would not be acting like a good, liberal democratic citizen.