Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea's Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

Ian Bowers,Henrik Stålhane Hiim

doi:10.1162/isec_a_00399

Abstract

In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, South Korea is quietly pursuing an independent conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy. This strategy is unique. Few, if any, nonnuclear states have sought to rely on advanced conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Why is South Korea pursuing a conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy, and what could its impact be on strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula? South Korea's approach should be understood as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment. Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea. Over the long term, capabilities such as advanced ballistic and cruise missiles bolster South Korea's nuclear latency. At the same time, we highlight that the strategy poses numerous technological and operational difficulties and has negative implications for arms race and crisis stability. Given South Korea's approach and North Korea's response, disarmament efforts focused purely on the bilateral U.S.–North Korea relationship will not succeed. Rather, any agreement will now need to address the growing gap in the conventional balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.

Highlights

F-35 oies over North Korea undetected, it drops a guided bomb on a ballistic missile about to deliver its deadly payload
We demonstrate how South Korea’s new capabilities may function as a hedge, namely by providing a stopgap deterrent if the U.S alliance fails in the short term, while over the longer term providing South Korea with strengthened nuclear latency. This ats within a long-standing strategy of hedging against U.S abandonment, and we argue that the United States has—somewhat counterintuitively—largely supported this approach
In the shadow of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, South Korea is pursuing comprehensive, independent, conventional counterforce, and countervalue capabilities. This strategy has received far less attention than the mercurial diplomacy of Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump, this article demonstrates that the strategy may have a determining effect on the prospects for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula

Summary

As a South Korean

F-35 oies over North Korea undetected, it drops a guided bomb on a ballistic missile about to deliver its deadly payload. While the South Korean case illustrates how deeply technological shifts are challenging common assumptions about nuclear strategy and, in particular, the role of conventional weapons, it demonstrates that dilemmas associated with both counterforce and leadership targeting endure Beyond these broader debates, our andings have important implications for discussions about the security landscape and peace on the peninsula. 2018 defense white paper stated that counterforce capabilities under development would focus on “omnidirectional security threats” instead of solely targeting North Korea.[16] Some commentators have argued that the name change and reduced public proale, of the KMPR, demonstrate a downgrading of these concepts within South Korean strategic planning.[17]. North Korean military planners likely perceive them as a threat and base their planning on these capabilities being directed against them

Why Pursue a Conventional Counterforce and Countervalue Strategy?

Main Challenges to Conventional Counterforce

Findings

Conclusion