Controlling Voice and Loyalty: The Regulation of Exit in Latin America

Abstract

AbstractFrom the colonial period until the present, exit has been a central feature of Latin American political life. This article analyses the history of emigration regimes in Latin America and finds that variables such as regime type, immigration drivers and the profile of those trying to exit are key to understanding how this practice is regulated throughout the region. We find that in Latin America, the decision to restrict, permit or even encourage exit has long been influenced by the need to maximize loyalty to incumbent rule while minimizing domestic dissent and potential hostility from foreign exile diasporas. Authoritarian regimes have historically fostered politically motived exit, yet demonstrate a reluctance to permit any unsanctioned elite emigration in order to prevent political rivals from generating hostility abroad. By contrast, democratic regimes seldom cause politically motivated exit in the same manner, yet have proven uninterested in addressing economically motivated exit because this serves to both relieve domestic pressures while stimulating the foreign remittance economy.