Contrasting effects of information sharing on common-pool resource extraction behavior: Experimental findings.

Dimitri Dubois,Phu Nguyen-Van,Stefano Farolfi,Juliette Rouchier,Valerio Capraro

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0240212

Abstract

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.

Highlights

In economics, goods are usually classified according to two dimensions: excludability and rivalry
Rivalry in extractive common goods implies that agents may think that they should consume as much of the good as possible, fearing that the others leave nothing
The graph at the bottom of the figure shows that the frequency of information sharing was relatively constant over time with a decrease in the VD treatment that was not observed in the FD treatment

Summary

Introduction

Goods are usually classified according to two dimensions: excludability and rivalry. A good is excludable if a person can be excluded from its consumption and is rival if its consumption by one person reduces its consumption by another. These two dimensions make it possible to classify goods into four categories: private goods (excludable and rival), club goods (excludable, but not rival), common goods (non-excludable, but rival) and public goods (non-excludable and non-rival). Rivalry in extractive common goods implies that agents may think that they should consume as much of the good as possible, fearing that the others leave nothing. Non-rivalry in public goods implies that agents have an incentive to benefit from the goods without contributing to their production.

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Conclusion