Contractual Rationalities

Abstract

Abstract Modern contract theories differ from one another along one principal dimension, namely the account of practical rationality that they employ. One class of theories draws upon modern expected utility theory; a second conceives of rationality in terms of deliberative reasoning. The purpose of this chapter is to offer an exposition of these two approaches. Modern utility theory is built upon the idea of imposing consistency conditions on the choices that agents make over alternatives. Utility is understood as a numerical representation of a consistent rank-ordering by individuals over alternatives. Utility theory been applied to studies of the interactions of individuals defined as rational in the required sense, in the form of game theory. Two types of game have been of particular interest to social contract theorist: positive sum bargaining games and the prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast with utility theory, there is no orthodox theory of deliberative rationality. However, there are some important formulations that shape the deliberative form of contract theory. One is the idea of the practical syllogism. Another is the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons. A third is the distinction between internal and external reasons. Both utility theory and deliberative theory should be thought to be normative. The principle of universalizability offers a distinctive conception of practical rationality that contrasts with contract theory.